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Book Reviews 
The Creative Imagination: Enlightewment to Romanticism by James Engell. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xix + 416. $16.00. 
This book is a study of the history of the idea of imagination from the 
end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth ·century in England, 
Scotland, and Germany. The British thinkers range from Hobbes to Coleridge, 
and' the German from Leibniz to Schelling. There is a cursory glance at a 
few American writers of this time, but writers of the French enlightenment are 
omitted because they "did not originate or develop the idea of the imagination 
in the same fashion nor to the same extent" (ix-x) as writers in England, 
Scotland, and Germany. 
I wish to begin this review with a discussion of the last chapter, entitled 
II Coleridge." This is the climax of the book, and all that precedes leads to it. 
Indeed, Coleridge the writer and thinker makes" imagination" a central concept 
and Engell does justice to the various meanings this idea has for Coleridge; 
he reveals the limitations of this idea and how Coleridge came to see some 
of its dangers as a substitute for religion. Engell relates Coleridge's views of 
imagination as these came to embrace subsidiary ideas and he traces the decline 
of this concept in the last fifteen years of Coleridge'S life, years in which he 
tried "to reconcile the Dynamic Philosophy with traditional Christianity." 
This exposition is one of the best we have of Coleridge on imagination. It 
is a model of what the book could have been. 
This is an ambitious work; certainly we have no study of the subject that 
is as detailed. Nor do we have any modern work that makes such claims for 
the idea of imagination itself: "During the eighteenth century the effort to 
define-to create-an idea of the imagination permitted and encouraged a critical 
survey of the entire creative process and of the history of literature and the arts. 
Such an opportunity was unprecedented. The immediate result was that the 
creative imagination emerged as the central value of the late eighteenth century 
and of Romanticism n (vii). Imagination, writes Engell at the conclusion 
of his Preface, I< is now considered, ,vithout question, the supreme value of art 
and literature" (x). Such a generalization seems more than the evidence 
warrants, especially since the very idea of the imagination as it presently exists 
is held to be inadequate. Edward S. Casey writes in Imagining (1976), "It is 
above all in existing theories of imagination that one finds the most telling 
instances of failure to distinguish between imagining and other sorts of mental 
acts, a failure based on an underlying descriptive inadequacy." 
Engell may inflate the idea of imagination in our time, but he is surely right 
in arguing that imagination was one of the central concepts used to explain 
the creation of literature at the beginning of the nineteenth century. His 
study deserves careful scrutiny both as a reference work for statements about 
the imagination and as a history of an idea. Considering the knowledge 
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the author commands of his subject and the writing and thinking of which 
he is capable, I am disappointed to find the book marred by two serious flaws. 
The first is the use of selective citation to make his case, and the second is a 
progressive or additive view of history. These are flaws that repeatedly 
call into question the adequacy of the history Engell tells. 
(1) Selective Citation. One of the most valuable contributions Tbe O'eative 
Imagination makes is in its presentation of an immense body of statements about 
the subject, including a considerable number by German theorists, who arc 
introduced as significant figures and studied in detail. Still, the quotations that 
are given from British critics, for example, do raise doubts about the interpretations 
and conclusions drawn from them. Such doubts arise from interpretations of 
the evidence that are frequently unsupported, sometimes resulting in contra-
dictory statements; the quotations often prove to be partial statements which 
when examined in context provide qualifications that are omitted; the references 
to poems and prose are made without attending to the functions of the different 
forms of writing. 
With regard to unsupported statements that can lead to contradictions, 
consider the following t\vo sentences in the text: "Hume keeps the faculty of 
judgment outside the sphere of imagination. Imagination may produce fictions or 
beliefs, but even beliefs are of a lower surety than' ideas of the judgment'" (55). 
And the sentence in which Hume is claimed to support the belief that the 
imagination alone creates our picture of reality; "Bed:eley's belief that the 
mind alone creates reality appealed to Blake, and although opposed to Blake 
and Berkeley in other respects, Hume had said essentially the same thing: the 
imagination alone creates our picture of reality" (247). This is not only 
a mistake about Hume's position, but it appears to be based on Hume's 
"Dissertation on the Passions" (1757), which was a ,vatered down version of 
Book II of the Treatise and which is not a work on epistemology or the nature 
of reality. Or consider the statement that "no major author before the 
Romantics is more concerned with the imagination or devotes to the subject 
a larger share of his work than Johnson in his writing on human nature. He 
especially probes the human imagination in the ten years from Tbe Vanity 
of Human TVisbes (1749) through the essays in the Rambler, Adventurer, and 
Idler to Rasselas (1759)" (58). But Johnson does not set this as his aim, not 
even in Rasselas; and Engell's example of The Vanity Of Human Wishes may 
stand as an instance of interpreting evidence to suit his argument: "The theme 
of Johnson's poem The Vanity of Human Wishes and of most of his moral 
essays is the necessary and constant cleansing and rectifying of the 'hunger 
of imagination' through reason, religion, and the stability of fact" (61). But 
surely this reworking of Juvenal into the Christian tradition of belief, discipline, 
and self-denial is not a study of the "imagination." 
I do not believe any deliberate distortion is involved in this claim, but I 
do think it is an effort to sho,,,,, that imagination was central to writers who 
primarily analyzed its dangers, as Johnson did in Rasselas. This bias probably 
accounts for the omissions in quotations that would qualify the statement 
Engell makes. He nvice quotes the opening of Rambler 60, the first time saying, 
"Charity or compasion would tlQt be possible without imagination" (61): and 
later 
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The idea of imaginative sympathy struck home even to Johnson, usually 
wary of the imagination as a guide. In Rambler 60 (October 13, 1750), 
he makes a sweeping assertion: II All joy or sorrow for the happiness or 
calamities of others is produced by an act of the imagination, that realizes 
the event ... by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him whose 
fortune we contemplate; so that we feel ... whatever emotions would be 
excited by the same good or evil happening to ourselves." (149) 
But if one puts in what the ellipses omit, it becomes apparent that Johnson 
(in Rambler 60, which deals with biography) is discussing responses to narratives: 
Ie All joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is produced by an 
act of the imagination, that realises the event however fictitious, or approximates 
it however remote, by placing us, for a time, in the condition of him whose 
fortune we contemplate; so that we feel, while the deception lasts, whatever 
emotions would be excited by the same good or evil happening to ourselves" 
(my italics). Johnson is urging that biographical writing deal with those 
events that can be readily adopted by readers because by doing so "we 
can more readily adopt the pain or pleasure proposed to our minds, by 
recognising them as once our own, or considering them as naturally incident 
to our state of life." 
The selective use of citations, while understandable, does give a false picture 
of what the cited critic is saying. For example, the author quotes a passage 
from Burke's essay "On Taste" in the second edition of the Inquiry which 
begins, "The mind of man possesses a sort of creative power of its own ... " and 
precedes it with the remark that the imagination "has a power to reorder 
experience and to cast nature in a new mould" (71). But in unquoted sentences 
from the same passage Burke says just the opposite, that" it must be observed, 
that the power of the imagination is incapable of producing anything absolutely 
new; it can only vary the disposition of those ideas it has received from the 
senses." 
These are representative instances, but they do raise questions about the 
interpretations of the citations, which seem to be selected by the premise of 
history as progression. I give one final example: in his discussion of Shelley, 
Engell writes, "Poetry, says Shelley in the Defence, 'acts in a divine and un-
apprehended manner, beyond and above consciousness.' The poet becomes an 
instrument of a higher melody" (261). But regardless of what Shelley may 
say elsewhere, this quotation refers to unappreciated poetry in the infancy 
of the world which gets to be appreciated by future generations. The full 
quotation is as follows: 
In the infancy of the world, neither poets themselves nor their auditors are 
fully aware of the excellence of poetry: for it acts in a divine and un-
-apprehended manner, beyond and above consciousness; and it is reserved 
for future generations to contemplate and measure the mighty cause and 
effect in all the strength and splendour of their union. 
One of the dangers in tracing the history of an idea is the temptation 
to disregard the contexts in which the idea appears. It is a temptation that 
can be, but is not always, resisted. The author finds, for example, that The 
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Prelude does not say much more, philosophically or critically, about the 
imagination than Akenside's Pleasure of tbe Imagination, a poem based on 
Addison's Spectator papers on this subject. 
The Prelude is a vindication of the attitude that imagination permeates life. 
And without this personal testament we would miss a closing link in this 
history of the idea: The Prelude does not, in a specifically philosophical 
or critical sense, say much more about the idea of the imagination than 
Akenside's Pleasures. But the individuality and the connected experiences 
in The Prelude are among the reasons why it is far greater. The idea 
becomes humanized. (266) 
Here is an instance in which the author's interest in the history of an idea 
seems to mislead him about the two different kinds of poetry, between a 
didactic poem and an autobiographical narrative. Is it not reasonable to 
assume that the "philosophy" of poetry exists in its form as well as in its 
overt discourse and that different forms imply concepts that need to be 
discriminated despite the similarities they share with other texts? 
(2) Engel/'s Concept of History. It may well be that one of the reasons 
the author does not recognize this difference is that he considers the 
history of imagination to be additive or progressive. In his Preface he 
puts it this way: II As an idea, the imagination grew by constant additions; 
each important .figure in the advenntre of this idea read scores of other 
writers. Yet there was a continual sense of affinnation, of preserving and 
not denying what had been stated before, and then enlarging on it" (vii). 
The consequence of this view of history is that Engell argues for a consistent 
and continuous development of the idea of II imagination" from Hobbes, 
Locke, and Leibniz to Coleridge, and minimizes or disregards the resistance to 
particular positions. It would be difficult from this history to grasp the 
differences between Locke and Leibniz and to know, that Kant opposed both 
empiricism and rationalism and sought a synthesis that was a significant recasting 
of these positions. 
Engell is not unaware of discontinuities in the idea of the imagination. But 
this realization does not lead him to change the kind of history he writes. In fact, 
it constitutes a kind of self-conscious afterthought. 
In the end, too, we must realize our tendency to look at remarks on the 
imagination for a clarifying and simplifying statement. We find dead-ends, 
labyrinths, and mazes. The vocabulary becomes unsteady, the definitions 
weak and unstable. But there is also a bright side to this situation. If nothing 
else, the confusion and the struggles of the best thinkers and writers of 
the Enlightenment and the Romantic period indicate what a powerful, 
complex, and subtle force the imagination is. (136) 
This statement could have formed the basis of a history of the imagination 
that would have provided a more acute understanding of this concept than 
is actually offered. This is unfortunate since Engell has done more work 
on this idea than anyone else who has written about the Enlightenment. But 
he has not seriously confronted what this passage means in terms of a history 
as progress. If he had, his history would have taken account not merely of 
. 
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additions but of dead ends as well, not merely progress but "the confusion 
and struggles of the best thinkers and writers of the Enlightenment and the 
Romantic period" showing "what a powerful, complex, and subtle force the 
imagination is." 
Engell makes amply clear what different, even contradictory, meanings were 
given to "imagination," both in Britain and Germany. But he does not write 
his history in terms of the problems particular philosophers were seeking 
to solve and what part imagination played in their inquiries. Rather, he 
proceeds by analyzing what they said only about imagination-with some 
exceptions such as Schelling and Coleridge. For this reasOD, even when 
he ,writes of philosophers like Leibniz and Locke, both are seen as developers 
of the imagination, and he gives Hobbes the position of initiator. This distorted 
view of philosophical history is especially obvious in the discussion of Kant: 
"For on the nature of imagination, Kant stands largely on the shoulders of 
Tetens [Johann Nicolaus Tetens (1736-1807)] ... " (118). 
Mr. Engell sees no pronounced break between the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries with regard to theories of the imagination. He persuasively 
links "associations of ideas," "sympathy," "genius" to imagination, and, in 
doing so, displays a command of ideas in the period. But here, again, his 
history is not clear about how or why such interconnections exist. He wishes 
to date certain facets of the idea of imagination from mid-century though he 
is not always precise about dates. On page 151 he writes, "Now, starting in 
the 1760s and 1770s, the poet's sympathetic power began to be seen as an adjunct 
of his imagination, and critical thinking increasingly explored this relationship." 
But on page 256 he finds that concepts of sympathy were explored ten years 
earlier: "Much of what Shelley says explicitly about the imagination is a ringing 
of the changes, in a high and impelling rhetorical mode, on ideas evolving 
and intertwining since Adam Smith and Alexander Gerard began to explore 
the concepts of sympathy and genius in the 1750s and 1760s." The 1770s are 
sometimes seen as the beginning of new ideas and sometimes as a plateau 
in which new ideas were not developed despite the fact that Britain and 
Germany in the last quarter of the eighteenth century were sharing ideas 
of the imagination: "From the early 17705, half a dozen years before Tetens' 
Pbilosophische Versuche and almost ten years before Kant's first Critique, 
Herder stirred the currents of new ideas" (115). Later in the book, 
however, he declares, "But we should note that before the 18208 America, 
too, like England and Scotland from the late 1770s to the early 1790s, was 
on a plateau" (189). 
My wish is not to show trivial discrepancies (who, after all, is guiltless of 
these) but to point out that Engell's view of history as progress, by neglecting 
oppositions or resistances or qualifications, leads to ambiguities in inter-
pretation. Apparently the author does not subscribe to Frye's view of an 
"age of sensibility" or to period tenus like "neoclassicism," but a develop-
mental history ought not eliminate the possibility of distinguishing crucial 
changes from minor ones. Which additions to the ideas of imagination 
could be considered developments of a norm, which the overturning of a 
norm? Hobbes and Leibniz become crucial figures in this history, but 
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does Hume's view of the imagination derive from theirs? Indeed, the 
author's use of the terms "influence," " hints," "parallel" seems, at the 
very least, problematic. 
As a result of emphasizing progression, Engell has to argue for continuity 
i I even when it does not exist-as witness the case of Johnson. And he has 
I' to minimize or reduce or ignore oppositions. Early in the book he declares, 
i "The figure of Newton, as Wordsworth describes him 'Voyaging through 
i! strange seas of Thought, alone,' had become for many eighteenth-century 
thinkers a symbol not so much of reason but of the imagination" (127). 
S f But in noting that Blake attacks Newton, he declares, "Blake aims a heavy 
verbal artillery on the earlier eighteenth century, on Locke and Newton, 
I but he finds few major enemies in English thought after the 1740s and 1750s 
when it comes to the idea of imagination" (248). But if Newton had 
become a symbol of imagination, Blake must be opposing this particular 
view. Blake and Wordsworth disagreed about the imagination, and no 
attempt is made to confront either the conflict or the kind of symbolic 
imagination Newton stood for. 
Engell does describe different views of imagination, but his book lacks 
any attempt to show how history involves critics and philosophers and 
! poets supporting, rejecting, or confronting one another. \Vhen Wordsworth-
in the 1800 "Preface" and in the 1802 "Appendix "-attacks Gray and 
I Johnson for their diction, he does so because the diction of poetry is in itself 
I characteristic of certain ideas that he "\vishes to oppose. It seems reasonable 
to assume that Wordsworth does not share the view of imaginative language 
held by the earlier poets. In consequence of its view of history as progression, 
The Creative Imagination tends to reduce differences, to give a harmony to 
human actions that they do not possess. 
A history that describes but does not analyze ideas leaves the reader 
with a vague notion of what different thinkers take the imagination to be. 
I have earlier criticized the selective citations, but I wish to indicate that 
! without a sense of the loose usage of an idea, we can have only an 
I inadequate sense of which of its aspects is undergoing development. Engell 
knows this; he is, however, more interested in tracing continuities than 
discontinuities. One of his procedures is to chart progress by showing that 
critics use similar terms. Referring to Blake, for example, he declares, "The 
universe is a construct of the imaginative power that is in both God and 
man, and when man realizes this, he has taken the first step to truth and 
salvation. Similar ideas appear in Akenside, Tucker, Thomas Brown, and 
Coleridge" (244). But such ideas are not couched in the language of Blake, 
nor do they form part of the same mythology, nor do they lead to the same 
kind of writing. 
I have spent most of this review documenting the two major flaws, although 
I have also sought to make clear the extensive research the boole contains. This 
research is most prominent in the Gennan tradition that Engen outlines. 
The book as a whole is divided into six parts \vhich proceed more or less 
chronologically: "Part One. Probing the Source," "Part Two. A Broader 
Stage," "Part Three. The Gennan Foundation," "Part Four. Faith in 
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the Imagination," "Part Five. Literary Explorations," "Part Six. Harmony 
of Being." In the last part, which contains discussions of Schelling and 
Coleridge, we find the most rewarding sections. 
Coleridge's view of the imagination is described as follows: 
The imagination, as it integrates the whole mind, is "an intermediate 
faculty, which is at once both active and passive," influencing and influenced 
by each faculty simultaneously. Then, by translating all mental activity 
into images or symbols, the imagination produces language that contains 
the whole potential or "potentized" mind. The understanding grasps tlus 
language and uses it for commuication. Without our imagination-created 
language, we arc defeated and lost-bereft, as Hobbes said, of civilization. 
(399) 
Coleridge was immersed in the imagination as power, and Engell shows how 
Coleridge stepped back from the implications of the Godlike role he attri-
buted to it. But how much of Coleridge's view is appropriate as an analysis 
of imagination? How adequate is his description of the mind's creative 
act? Is our consciousness, our writing, a result of "one organic and harmon-
ious pr-ocess" (339)? Do not our epiphanic moments occur outside the 
harmony that 'Coleridge posited? Is his description adequate to explain the 
interrelation between individual and communal imaginative acts? 
Engell is right in assuming that Blake, Coleridge, and Shelley identified 
"imagination" with all creative acts. But were they correct in doing so? 
Of course, if one writes of the "creative imagination," it is not identical 
with declaring that the imagination is creative. And Engell acknowledges 
the "uncreative" views of the imagination. But what precisely are the 
" creative" functions of the imagination with. respect to learning, speaking, 
thinking? 
Such questions arise because Engell's work is so wide-ranging and pro-
vocative. In opening up the German tradition in the history of an idea, 
he has made it possible for scholars to do in detail for minor writers what 
he has done for Coleridge. In this sense, the work ought to call forth 
new scholarship. It is bound to serve as a valuable reference work for those 
who study the eighteenth-century and Romantic imagination. It illustrates 
the pervasiveness and interconnectedness of imagination with other ideas. 
But as a history, it -will need to be reimagined. The chapter on Coleridge 
stands as a model of what such reimagining might be. 
RALPH COHEN 
University of Virginia 
Imitation and Pmise in the Poems of Ben Jonson by Richard S. Peterson. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xxi + 247. $18.50. 
Richard .S. Peterson has produced a well-turned study to which Jonson 
scholars "\VIU not only turn but also return for some years. They will 
return to reconsider his theory of humanist and Jonsonian imitation for 
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writing and for living, to learn from his additional supply of Jonson's 
sources and analogues, and to enjoy his perceptive, intricate, and learned 
readings of Janson's laudatory poetry and his suggested interpretations of 
Jonson's other works. Moreover they will recommend that their colleagues 
and students turn to Peterson's study to enjoy watching two interesting 
minds at worlc-Jonson creating by transforming the past and Peterson 
recreating by recovering that tradition. For Peterson's major task is inventing 
(perhaps in our sense, certainly in the Renaissance rhetoricians' sense) a 
context in which to read Jonson and other classically and morally based 
poets. 
To engage his study Peterson has focussed on Jonson's imitation-not on 
the familiar translation or adaptation, allusion or echo, genre or topos, diction or 
syntax, rhythm or scheme, but rather on the metaphoric and moral develop-
ment of art and life. Peterson assumes, with no inconsiderable number of 
examples, that metaphors in a very physical sense do inform poetry and 
can shape lives. Thus in his study of Jonson's poems of praise those honored 
and addressed take sl12.pes that arc then moralized-William Roe as an alembic, 
Sir Thomas Roe as a colunm, Sir Kenelm Digby as a palace, Venetia Digby 
as a temple, Sir William Uvedale as a cabinet, Sir Henry Morison and Lucius 
Cary, Viscount Falkland as the dioscuri, Shakespeare as a lance, and even 
Ben Jonson himself as a vase. Such metaphors, through connotations and 
puns, carry tremendously greater complexity and suggestiveness than new 
images. For Jonson turned such metaphors out, according to Peterson, by 
reading, assimilating, and recreating them, by excavating, digesting, and 
transforming them from classical masterworks into seventeenth-century poems 
of praise. Peterson's thesis, then, is that Jonson wrote .by rediscovering 
and reinventing the 1.vitty metaphors latent in and repeatedly refined through 
literature of the past, and by applying these complex ,vitty metaphors to 
subjects in the present so as to restore and expand both metaphors and the 
human moral potential they honor and communicate. Moreover, both the 
Renaissance poet and his twentieth-century critic would seem to maintain 
that such activity makes the classics, and indeed the literature and life of any 
era, worthwhile. 
To further focus his study Peterson has concentrated on Jonson's poems 
of praise-on taus rather than on the satiric vitupemtio more often discussed 
by students of Jonson's idea of imitation and lyrics. Nor does Peterson deal 
with all the poems of praise. Instead, first he outlines Jonson's general theory 
inside the context of other Renaissance theories of imitation and describes 
Jonson's aesthetics and moral practice of imitation by interpreting Jonson's 
theory through pronouncements, masques, and plays, as well as poems, 
suggesting all along full readings of shore poems addressed to Camden, 
the Roes, Digbys, Rutlands, and others. Next he presents intensive and 
extensive paradigmatic readings of "An Epistle Answering to One that 
Asked to Be Sealed of the Tribe of Ben," "To the Memory of My 
Beloved, the Author Mr. William Shakespeare: And What He Hath Left Us," 
and "To the Immortall Memorie, and Friendship of that Noble Paire, Sir 
Lucius Cary, and Sir H. Morison." Peterson's evidence and his mode of 
vz 
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operating call to mind Rosemond Tuve and D. C. Allen-but with additions. 
Besides tracing image clusters through classical poems, emblem books, con-
temporary literature, and Jonson's own works, he also traces them through 
the works of moral philosophy. Thus Peterson is likely to cite an image 
in varying forms and interpretations in Plato, Cicero, Plutarch, Quintilian, 
AU50niuS, and lVIacrobius, as well as in Horace, Seneca, Martial, and Juvenal, 
in Bacon as well as in emblem writers and major and minor Renaissance poets. 
Here we might like to have more contemporary support from Renaissance 
dictionaries, commentaries, and editions. 
Beyond interpreting the poem itself in its tradition, Peterson extends the 
moral implications of the image patterns through Jonson's aesthetics and 
the ideal life he tried to promote. Thus Peterson's readings become readings 
of an ideal moral stance for a particular society as well as of individual 
poems, a genre, and an aesthetic stance. Here we might like to learn more 
about Jonson's relationship to the actual people and society he addresses. 
But both of his extensions of metaphorical readings of lyrics make Peterson's 
work all the more valuable-as a study of Jonson's poems of praise and as a 
model for other influence studies to come. 
vVith learning and insight Peterson has also \vittily and gracefully returned 
to Jonson and Jonson's sources to shape his own well-turned study on 
the complex metaphorical design underlying Jonson's sense of the classical 
ode. The turn, the counter-turn which completes the circle, and the stand, 
along with the complex web of connotations and puns these suggest, carry 
into Peterson's design and style, endowing it with an elegant formal structure 
and making it a persuasive exemplum of the very metaphors he is considering. 
In brief, Richard S. Peterson's important new study of Jonson's verse 
offers scholars valuable new sources for Jonson's poetry; more, it offers 
splendid if occasionally overwrought interpretations of a number of central 
Jonson poems and still more suggestions about how to read many Jonson 
works in a new context of imitation for writing and for living; most, it 
offers an extended model for influence studies which moves far beyond formal 
patterns to social concerns and ethical positions. In closing Peterson's volume 
we might like very much to see a greater synthesis accounting for other 
patterns and arguments besides metaphorical ones and including satiric epigrams 
as well as paeans inside epideictic; we might even want a summa accounting 
for Jonson's whole monument of theory, poems, masques, and plays founded 
on his notion of imitation. But we can scarcely ask for a more informative, 
useful, or delightful study than Peterson's, to \vhich the authors of any such 
syntheses will have to return to reread, digest and transform, and build upon. 
rnA CLARK 
University of Florida 
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English Dramatic Form, 1660-1800: An Essay in Generic History by Laura 
Brown. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xvi + 
240. $19.50. 
Brown's interesting and provocative essay addresses, as she says, both his-
torical and conceptual problems. She traces the evolution of dramatic form 
in both serious and comic plays over a hundred-year period that witnessed 
major formal changes in drama, the decline of drama in the eighteenth 
century, and the concurrent rise of the novel. 
Brown's conception of formal history is based largely on R. S. Crane's 
"Critical and Historical Principles of Literary History" (The Idea of the 
Humanities [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967], II, 45-156). Unlike 
many recent critics of Restoration and eighteenth-century drama, Brown 
discerns both direction in the development of drama and shape in its history. 
She believes that "it is not only possible but essential to find a means of 
organizing and classifying" the drama of the period, and that this can 
best be done by examining major works, which "are more representative of 
their genre and of their period than minor or average worles because they 
come closer to fulfilling the potential of their form. They grasp the 
realities of their age more fully, and they embody its concerns and contra-
dictions more fully." The form of Restoration and eighteenth-century 
drama, Brown says, "can be most generally described as a coherent fiction." 
In morc specific terms, "these plays are actions, constructed from the unfolding 
conflicts and relationships among characters whom we understand according 
to our evaluation of them in the terms of their represented fictional world." 
These actions can vary according to evaluative terms propounded, characters 
and conflicts represented, and relationships among "characters' deserts and 
fates." These conceptions of form and action, indebted to the work of 
Crane, Sheldon Sacks, and Ralph Rader, are thoroughly "neo-Aristotelian," 
but Brm;vn's methodology depends on a further theoretical assumption that 
she says is less neo-Aristotelian-the idea that "literary form is ultimately 
imprinted with the ideology of the age." But this is not a major departure 
from neo-Aristotelian concepts of form. Central to Crane's definition of form, 
for example, is the notion that a literary work carries values or norms by 
which the worth of characters and actions are evaluated; it is a small 
additional step to trace those values to the ideology of a given age, and 
even that step is unnecessary when operative values are universal, which 
is the case with many values in eighteenth-century drama and some in Restor-
ation drama. When they are local (tied, for instance, to a particular code 
of honor or social class), as more frequently happens in the Restoration, it 
is useful to trace them to specific ideological sources, although any coherent 
individual literary work contains values that are accessible without reference 
to an external ideology. Brown's manner of tying literary form to the ideology 
of its historical period, hmvever, is very helpful in increasing our under-
standing of the broad issues of generic history in the Restoration and 
eighteenth century since the moral forms of the latter depend on bourgeois 
values that differ radically from the aristocratic values of Rcstoration social 
lIP 
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faons. She is more concerned \vith the very general shift of values that 
took place between the Restoration and the mid-eighteenth century than 
with particular events of social or political history because the former 
ultimately tell us morc about changes in generic history. And, as she says, 
these historical forces "appear only at the periphery" of her discussion and 
arc subordinated to more strictly literary analysis. 
Her analysis begins by defining formal categories based on examinations of 
individual plays, and her further analysis of the relatiol1::.hips among these 
categories forms the basis of her history of drama in the period. She 
demonstrates convincingly that serious and comic drama throughout the 
period, responding to the same historical forces, undergo parallel and related 
processes of formal change. Restoration audiences, for example, need not 
have been schizophrenic in responding to such apparently dissimilar plays as 
The Conquest of Grff7wda and Tbe Country lVife since they in some senses 
resemble each other more than the latter resembles an eighteenth-century 
comedy. Heroic action and dramatic social satire, the two major forms Brown 
identifies in the period from 1660 to 1677, are alike in that both base their 
actions on aristocratic social standards of assessment, the former on a precise 
honor code and the latter on contemporary genteel manners. Neither form 
is static within this period. Early heroic plays affirm the governing aristocratic 
code unambiguously, but later ones evince a (( fragmentation" of the code or 
contain radical protagonists who violate it. Restoration dramatic social satire 
depends on the "discrepancy between the social assumptions that are ex-
pressed explicitly in the working out of the action and the dramatist's implicit 
moral position." There is a greater degree of discrepancy between the 
represented social context and the dramatist's implicit moral judgment in 
Wycherley than in Etherege, for example. Both forms, Brown argues, 
establish limits on options available to future playwrights by failing to provide 
alternatives to the status quo because of limited social scope, and by adopting 
dramatic assumptions that preclude complexity of character development. 
The forms Brown identifies in the period from 1677 to 1707 are affective 
tragedy and transitional comedy. The defining characteristic of the former is 
its "dependence upon the audience's pitying response "; "action and meaning 
depend upon the affective power of the protagonist's plight." Hence pity 
replaces admiration. In transitional comedy, the social assessment of dramatic 
satire begins to he replaced by evaluations based on characters' inner moral 
worth. Brown argues that transitional comedy does not have a coherent form 
of its own since there can be no formal middle ground between social satire and 
moral action. The former assumes that audiences will examine critically what 
is presented on stage, whereas a moral action expresses directly the morality of 
its audience. Transitional comedy is "a coherent collection of individual 
responses or capitulations to the forces of generic change." Hence transitional 
comedy (Shad'\vell, Durfey, Southerne, Cibber, Vanbrugh, Congreve, Farquhar) 
arises from the "collision of two incompatable modes," often resulting in plays 
in which "social and moral are simply juxtaposed." A happy by-product of 
this collision is a freedom (exercised by Congreve and Vanbrugh) to experiment 
with complex characterization since the introduction of moral values eliminates 
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the need for social stereotypes on ,,,hich sarire depends and since the decreased 
emphasis on "manners" allows for psychological complexity in characterization. 
Hence The lVay of the HI arfd "is uniquely representative of this transitional 
drama in its subtle definition of internal motintions and moral values in an 
aggressively social context." 
The form that dominates the first half of the eighteenth century in both 
serious and comic drama is moral action, \vhich directly represents and defines 
merit in terms of inner moral worth and assumes a direct identification between 
audience and protagonist. The form is implicitly or explicitly didactic and 
predominately sentimental and realistic. BrO'wl1 argues that because of the 
"self-conscious continuity of dramatic cyolution" (chiefly constraints of char-
acterization and scope), dramatic moral action fails where novelistic moral 
action succeeds in surmounting the problem of "achieving a generativc relation-
ship between the moral merit of the exemplary J:hence static] protagonist and the 
process of a dynamic action that produces his or her fate." Richardson over-
comes the problem chiefly through psychological complexity, Fielding through 
social scope. 
Brown remarks in her introduction that her task is the difficult one of "re-
conciling the details of individual texts \'lith the process of literary eyolution." 
One of thc best ways to test the value of a generic history is to ask how 
useful it is in elucidating the individual texts that fall within its purview. 
Brown's excellent study significantly increases our understanding of numerous 
plays in the period. Her discussion of the evolution of hcroic action, for 
example, yields valuable insights into the nature of Dryden's mature heroic 
dramas, m'Llch as her conception of transitional comedy results in a stimulating 
reappraisal of Congreve's achievement. But there arc occasions on which her 
conceptual terms seem either to encourage misplaced emphases or to disregard 
alternative readings. For example, in defining the discrepancy between social 
and moral assessment in The Man of kIode, Brown makes too much of Etherege's 
"implicit criticism" of Dorimant. Rather than being juxtaposed to Harriet's 
"naturalness," Dorimant's social accomplishment complement.') her equal ability 
to dissemble and manipulate. Their exchange in III, iii makes it clear that each 
is capable (or "guilty") of affected agreeableness. And any sympathy for 
Dorimant's cast mistresses is wasted or short-lived; Bellinda, the best candidate for 
such sympathy, enters their affair \vith her eyes open, knowing both Dorimant's 
nanue and the rules of the game. Similarly, in defining the moral action of 
Cato, Bro\YI1 argues that Addison intends audiences to ,'iew his protagonist as 
one whose absolute yirtue remains "unqualified and unAinching" from 
beg-inning- to end. and that, faced with a static and infallible hero, he resorts to 
tri~ker~' in pro\'iding a dynamic plot b~c prox:; (through subsidiary chaf3cters), 
thus giying Caw "the credit of a tragic action \\,ithout any of the normally 
attendant flaws." C!c\'Cr;lS it is. I think this explanation is misraken. I ha\'e 
ar~llcd clsc\\,hcre that the cmphasis of Act V focuscs on Cato's fallibilit),. More-
en'I. shortl~· before composing the LIst act (nine ~'ears after the first four werl' 
finished), Addison wrote that ";1 person of an absolutr.: :H1d C0I1S11Il1Ill:1te yirtul' 
should ncnr be introduced in tra~edy" (SjJecf,Hor :-':0, 273; Jalluan' 1712) 
bCC1l1SC the spectacle of perfect ,'ir;ue'suffering may nise pity but no~ terror, 
II 
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since we do not resemble the suffering person. Ultimately, Cato is not a moral 
action that attempts to depict an infallible man of unqualified virtue. 
A final caveat: perhaps any study that organizes dramatic history in broad 
generic categories risks suggesting that its categories arc morc inclusive than 
they are. Brown's work traces the major generic shifts in Restoration and 
eighteenth-century drama admirably, but there are numerous plays that remain 
outside her categories. Many full-length comic and serious plays written after 
1700, for example, do not take the form of moral action. 
Brown's essay is an jIDportant contribution to the study of Restoration and 
eighteenth-century drama and the latter's relationship to the novel. By 
example, it also answers some of our questions about how generic history can 
and should be approached. 
JAMES S. 1V1ALEK 
DePaul University 
An E."Cemplary History of the Novel: The Quixotic versus the Picaresque by 
Walter L. Reed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. vii + 
334. $22.50. 
Reflections on tbe Hero as Quixote by Alexander Welsh. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981. Pp. x + 244. $15.00. 
Although Walter Reed and Alexander Welsh proclaim quite different 
objectives in their respective discussions of the European-American novel, they 
share more than might at first appear evident. In his Reflections on the Hero 
as Quixote, W clsh regards Cervantes' hero as the incarnation of an attitude 
toward life that he himself has a strong tendency to share. By defining this 
attitude and examining variations upon it in the « quixotic" heroes of Joseph 
And"ews, Tristram Shandy, The Vicar of 117akefield, Pickwick Papers, The 
Nerl.Dcomes, and The Idiot, he has found a vehicle for his own philosophical 
speculations on the linkage between individual identity and the pursuit of justice 
in an arbitrary and ultimately incomprehensible world. In contrast, Reed 
employs Don Quixote and the Spanish picaresque as opposing narrative 
possibilities in the history (or" diacritical space") of the novel. Tracing this 
opposition through a series of primary examples (Moll Flanders, Joseph Andrews, 
Tristram Shandy, Pickwick Papers, Vanity Fair, The Confidence Man, A 
Connecticut Yankee in King ArthU1"s Court, Felix Krull, Tl:Je Sot-lVeed Factor, 
and Terra Nostra), he advances his thesis that the novel in either of these fonus 
is essentially a defiance of established literary tradition and, by extension, a 
challenge to conventional modes of thought and behavior. 
vVhat conjoins these apparently disparate enterprises is not only the pre-
eminence which they accord to Cervantes' masterpiece. They also share a 
common tendency to distance themselves from the New Critical, structuralist, 
and deconstructionist approaches which have influenced them in various ways, as 
they themselves would undoubtedly admit. Even though Welsh's book is a 
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meditation on the nature of life and Reed's is an anti-systematic history of the 
novel, both construct their central hypotheses around a Romantic notion of 
individuality, which in turn becomes a determining characteristic in their 
definitions of literary realism. For Welsh, individuality can be attained by 
people who perceive an injustice, attempt to rectify it, and ultimately suffer 
pain or humiliation as a consequence of their efforts; such people go beyond 
the conventional roles and ethical principles which an existing social order 
obliges them to adopt, and in doing so, they become uniquely themselves. 
Accounts of tIus equixotic sequence of experiences arc realistic, Welsh contends, 
because they correspond with the "way things are." 
According to Reed, individuality inheres in the novelistic text which, by its 
nature, defies generic constraints and introduces non-literary semantic codes in 
an attempt to assert its own novelty and truthfulness in the face of stereotypical, 
falsifying conventions from an existing literary tradition. He proceeds to 
suggest that the diverse codes and the demands of tradition are reconciled with 
these claims to uniqueness in a series of negotiations enacted in the text. 
Because these negotiations are governed by a consistent set of priorities, he coins 
the term" protocol" to describe them and to denominate what might be regarded 
as the identity principle of any given text. Such works are realistic in the 
sense that literary traditions and conventions always seem inadequate to the 
felt reality of a contemporary period, whereas by striving for uniqueness, the 
novel seeks to provide what is missing from tradition and convention. 
Like Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset, Welsh uses Quixote and the quixotic hero 
as pretexts for elaborating his own philosophy, of life, and it is on this basis 
that his "reflections" must ultimately be judged. The major tenents of his 
position emerge most clearly in his delineation of a dialectical opposition be-
tween the quixotic hero and the historical realist hero, invented by Sir "Valter 
Scott and best exemplified by Victor Hugo's Jean Valjean. This opposition, he 
argues, is the source of tensions which can be observed in twentieth-century 
fictional heroes like Nabokov's Humbert Humbert. However, Welsh himself 
finds the historical realist pole of this opposition inadequate to a genuine under-
standing of the human condition, because it is based on the untenable belief 
that history will necessarily sanction individual identity and culminate in a 
just situation. For the historical realist hero, quixotism or idealism is no more 
than an adolescent state which the mature hero simply outgrows. 
However, if "existence is absurd," as Welsh assumes, this attitude represents 
a false closure on what can only be an unending search for meaning. The two 
types of meaning with which he is most concerned are individual identity and 
justice, and his paradigmatic model for discussing them is the quixotic hero. 
In both the real world and in the fictional '\vorld of Don Quixote, injustice is 
encountered only by accident, and most inj'Ustices simply recede into the 
"tangled web" of circumstances in which any attempt to rectify them would 
require the perpetration of a new injustice. Yet when injustice penetrates the 
individual consciousness and generates an impulse to transform "the way things 
are" into" the way things ought to be," the individual begins to sense his own 
being apart from the conventional roles and habits he has been conditioned 
to accept. And when an individual acts upon this impulse, he is defending the 
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principle that the creation of his identity lies in his own hands, although he 
may wel] be modelling his behavior on what he considers to be worthy models. 
Because the overwhelming power of law, social practice, or physical superiority 
often stand in opposition to the impulse toward justice and personal identity, 
the individual who pursues them is repeatedly subjected to practical jokes or 
to the vicissitudes of circumstance which confront his idealistic aspirations with 
the harshness of objective reality. He is made to appear foolish, but there 
remains something admirable about him, because he has acted upon noble values-
values which remain deeply embedded in the social fabric, despite a widespread 
tendency to repress them. Rather than acquiesce in the comforting teleology 
which the historical realist hero imposes on the world, the quixotic hero sym-
bolizes the recognition that individuals can find authenticity and uniqueness in 
an endless but disciplined resistance to injustice. Within an environment char-
acterized by the" essential arbitrariness of all activity," Welsh concludes, "a 
quixotic identity is actually not worth anything, though it may be the only strictly 
individual identity that is available." Obviously, he is using the example of 
Quixote to illustrate a largely existentalist attitude toward life, and his readers 
will have to determine the deg_ree to which his "reflections" correspond to their 
own experiences of the world, but, whether or not the quixotic hero can support 
such a philosophy, Welsh has successfully outlined a recurrent pattern of 
character portrayal in the novel, and he has suggested cogent reasons why 
authors like Fielding, Sterne, Goldsmith, Dickens, Thackeray, and Dostoevski 
were attracted to it in a form originally devised by Cervantes. 
Reed is far less concerned with the philosophical and referential qualities of 
literature than he is with the possibility that novels can be studied as readings 
of existing texts. Within the larger dialectical process that opposes the novel, 
which consistently seeks to assert its individuality and uniqueness in the face 
of nco-classical canons and generic rules, he discovers a more limited dialectic 
between the quixotic novel and the picaresque novel. Both first appeared in 
Golden Age Spain, and both dramatize problems confronted by a new class 
of readers-the conflict between high idealism and mundane reality in quixotic 
fictions and the opposition between divine transcendence and human degradation 
in the picaresque novels. Although he docs not always describe with precision 
the ways in which subsequent novels re-enact the quixotic and the picaresque, he 
insists that they comprise the "most extensive series of rereadings of the 
novel by the novel in European and Westernized literary history." 
Such a claim exceeds the limited evidence Reed presents to justify it, but 
his larger thesis about the inherently anti-systemic, anti-generic thrust of the 
novel is in any case far more provocative, and he is wise to place more emphasis 
upon it than upon the quixotic-picaresque opposition to which the bODle's subtitle 
draws attention. According to Reed, both Cervantes and writers of early 
picaresque fictions recognized that the technology of the printed book opened 
the possibility of addressing readers who might not share the nco-classical tastes 
of aristocratic audiences and who would vvelcome the novel's assertion of its 
independence from them. At the same time, they realized that the autonomy 
they gained in this fashion was passed on to their ne\v readers, who would 
not feel as constrained in interpreting novelistic texts as they might feel in 
k 
in, 
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reading traditional works governed by the rules of a prescriptive poetics. 
In other words, the authority of the text is displaced from its producer to its 
consumer-the "idle reader" whom Cervantes anticipates as a detached 
observer of Don Quixote's adventures. Because Cervantes knows that such 
readers arc free to amend the "protocol" of a novel, he is also aware that he 
has lost some control over the performance of his own creation. Out of this 
awareness emerges the possibility of a new author-reader relationship which 
serves as an enabling precedent for all subsequent novelists. 
This manner of approaching literature is capable of stimulating significant 
new insights into the history of the novel. It is unfortunate that Reed did not 
utilize it more often in his discussions of individual texts, but his knowledge of 
contemporary theory is so eclectic and his readings in primary texts so wide-
ranging that he often pursues interesting digressions rather than focusing on 
the main thread of his argument. For the same reason, he occasionally applies 
different modes of analysis to different texts. For example, his chapter on 
Sterne is essentially a close textual reading which involves character analysis 
and the unobjectionable contention that the author's own life was projected into 
his fiction. Such an approach is neither original nor immediately relevant to 
Reed's overall purpose. Tn contrast, his chapter on Moll Flanders convincingly 
relates Defoe's novel to the rise of neo-classicism and the existence of subliterary 
popular fiction. The real difficulty with Reed's bool{, however, lies in the 
self-contradictory nature of his enterprise, for one cannot write history 
without accepting the possibility of referential discourse. Admittedly he counters 
tIus criticism in advance by proposing to write an "exemplary" lustory that 
eschews evolutionary hypotheses and proceeds by example, but, as Welsh has 
shovm in his philosophical meditations on the extrinsic relevance of Quixote's 
fictional experiences, history is more than "a tissue of texts" and novels are 
more than "readings of earlier novels." 
Despite digressiveness and an intertextualist bias, Reed's book is a theoretically 
exciting one, for it offers readers the spectacle of an intellectually perceptive, 
well-read critic grappling with an extraordinarily complex problem. He may 
not have resolved it, but his insights are provocative, and they suggest 
numerous avenues for possible future speculation. Welsh's book is less theoretically 
provocative, although it may prove attractive to a larger audience for precisely 
that reason. The t\VO books do share several underlying" imaginative structures," 
and they do begin with readings of the Quixote as a seminal work in the history 
of the novel; however, their goals are different and perhaps incompatible. Yet 
that should not deter people from picking up either book. Both are capable 
of engaging the serious reader in a lively intellectual dialogue. 
RICHARD BJORNSON 
The Ohio State University 
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Literary Democracy: The Declaration of Cultural Independence in America by 
Larzer ZitI. New York: The Viking Press, 1981. Pp. xxv + l3J. $20.00. 
Larzer Ziff's Literary Democracy does not break into Qur understanding of 
the Jacksonian period in American literature with any fresh news. The special-
ist will turn through it quickly, admiring the skill of its summarizing, the 
deftness of its paraphrase, and leave the book ,vith his judgment of the great 
Jacksonian writers unaltered. This particular mythos, the Coming of Age, the 
Declaration of Cultural Independence, the Flowering, the Rebirth, has been told 
before. In his preface Zift warily poses his precursors, Van Wyck Brooks and 
F. O. Matthiessen, and suggests that his approach will span the divergence of 
their historical writing. Brooks, it will be remembered, was essentially a 
social historian, Matthiessen an aesthetician. Here, then, is Ziff, with Society 
(historical remarking) and Literature (interpretation), these two boulders. 
For the historian who noes not have a political thesis driving his analysis, 
the project of fitting these two boulders together is very hard-and it is even 
harder to keep them moving in a synchronized motion. That has always been 
a problem in the writing of literary history, and Brooks and Matthiessen can 
indeed be seen to represent different resolutions. Ziff, however, does not resolve 
this problem; he simply moves back and forth. Two chapters are assigned 
to each major figure. Ziff will typically establish a socia-political framework 
in the first chapter, and then do a close reading of the respective texts in the 
second. Because neithcr the historical information nor the literary interpretation 
is surprising, a challenge to received opinion, one begins at length to consider 
the questions Ziff did not ask in Literary Democ1'acy, to question his methodology. 
What, after all, does "cultural independence" mean? We need somehow to 
lmow that before "\ve entertain the question of how it happened bet\Veen 1837 
and 1861 in American literature. Those detailed and comprehensive histories of 
the concept, Perry Miller's The Raven and The Whale and Benjamin Spencer's 
Tbe Quest for Nationality, dcmonstrate conclusively that it was a hot topic 
in the Jacksonian period, but how seriously, apart from its presence in con-
temporary rhetoric, its legendary existence, are we to take it? Whitman begins 
with the topic in the 1855 Leaves of Grass, declaring the independence of American 
poetry in the preface, but then he finishes the declaration and settles down to his 
real subject, 11lyself. There is ironic reference to it in TV alden. Melville plays 
with the idea in Moby Dick, and savages it in Pierre. It is a trope in the 
literature, the American Idea, the American Scholar, an American Art, but what 
practically is its stature? "Literary democracy grew from the new nationalism," 
Ziff tells us, and then must explain the alienation of the major Jacksonian writers 
from that nationalism. It could just as easily be argued that the concept (or 
trope) is anterior, peripheral, and that the importance of Emerson, Thoreau, 
Melville and Whitman lies in their ability to transcend the simpleminded 
nationalism of their period and become, one by one, cosmopolitan, trans-cultural 
writers. Melville's struggle in Moby Dick is with Shakespeare, not Jefferson. 
The causative line in Ziff's thinking often falls, one-two-three, too readily into 
place. "One is led to the hypothesis," he writes, "that not only did America 
need to come into possession of a positive nationalism before a native literature 
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could flourish, but that it had to dispossess certain groups in the process so as to 
free (if not compel) their children to respond with the weapons of thought." 
These are the securities of the literary historian who writes after Trone 
and before Foucault. Do not look for an inspection of motive, moral, or plot 
in this text. What arc the politics of Zift's Literary Democracy? To which 
interpretation of the period does it belong? Ideologically, this study is written 
midstream in the post-Parringtonian mainstream. Those" native" writers who 
came into the possession of a "positive" nationalism are herein studied. Ziff's 
justification for his exclusions is peremptory. Irving, Cooper and Bryant are 
"conservatives" who" trim their ",vork to foreign dimensions." We are, as we 
read Literm'y Democracy, in the surehanded grip of a positivist. This is a 
literary history that ends happily. In this regard, Literary Democ1'acy is an 
enjoyable book There are fine moments when a donnish aperc;.:u will be well-
turned, Ziff's appreciation of Emerson's critique of the solid English self, for 
example, is keenly rendered. Everything is familiar in this history, even the 
selection of the tributary texts: Uncle Tom's Cabin, Women in tbe Nineteenth 
Century, The .Monks of }lIon!?. Hall, which are roundly reasoned forth. This 
is a sensible reading of Hawthorne, the judgment of Margaret Fuller is fair, and 
ditto the piece on Poe. Zift's" phonemic" analysis of "Song of Myself" will 
strike some as rather labored, but his overall sense of Whitman is sound. So, 
with anecdote, with aperc;.:u, he summarizes the relation of Jacksonian literature 
to Jacksonian society, shows these particular writers struggling with and ex-
pressing certain salient democratic ideas and myths, and the summary is com-
fortably stated within a finished interpretation. What are the politics of 
Literary Democracy? The composition of this study, with its .major and minor 
figures, resembles the composition of the present Supreme COUIt. 
The problem finally with Litemry Democracy is that it isn't very democratic. 
Ziff rereads the canon, minus the conservatives, sans Cooper, and betrays 
really a parochial and/or elitist conception of what is in a democratic literature: 
essays, meditations, poetry, fiction. Could not onc consider those jewels of 
Jacksonian oratory, the vVebster-Hayne debate, the Lincoln-Douglas debate, 
eminent examples of a democratic literary art, high symbolic drama? And why 
is it that all such liberally inclined literary histories continue to ignore the 
relevance of Tbe Book Of }VIormon? Here, take it any way you like, is the 
most significant of the homespun masterpieces in the Jacksonian period, a sacred 
i text" written" by the commonest of all the Jacksonian writers, a preliterate, out-
of-work seryer, one of the roughs. Joseph Smith would not only invent a 
fabulous prehistory for the New World, he would go on to reconstitute, in his 
own terms, for his own church, the Declaration of Independence and the 
Federal Constitution. Ziff does not explore the range of Jacksonian writing that 
lies outside the described field of the American Renaissance. Still, it is pleasurable 
to take again that walk around Brooklyn with Whitman and Thoreau, to think 
of Thoreau as a porcupine, to go out tramping with Emerson and Carlyle. Ziff 
astutely renders these scenes, explains the significance of the event, and 
at tIlls level, as informed professorial narrative, Literary Democracy is absorbing. 
NEIL SCHMITZ 
State University of New York at Buffalo 
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Hiers to Dionysus: A Nietzscbean Current in Literary Modernism by John Burt 
Foster Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 474. $27.50. 
Foster's is a very intelligent and sensitive book, exemplary in its scrupulous, 
detailed scholarship and a lucid, tcachcrly treatment of concepts and texts. 
Convinced that" if the recent turn towards theory in literary studies has raised 
the intellectual level of criticism, it has also undermined our respect for 
details" (403), Foster proposes a resolutely empirical attention to what 
he calls the "literary legacy" of Nietzsche. Such attention entails a good 
deal more than a precise record of facts. By keeping a wary distance from 
contemporary views of Nietzsche he hopes to recover the variety of ways 
Nietzsche elicits from Gide, Mann, Lawrence and Malraux "shifting and 
imaginative sympathies" which must be "rendered in images, characters, 
situations and dialogue" (410). 
Foster begins with a definition of modernism general enough to accommodate 
the variety he seeks while still indicating the central presence Nietzsche \Yill 
have within it. "The modernist has a sense of having made a break with the 
traditions of the recent past that is more drastic than would have occurred in a 
continuous process of growth and development" (3), so he or she is likely to 
react to this sense of break by radical experimentation in form (either to 
recover the past or to clarify our distance from it) and by a sharp questioning 
of all received values. This questioning produces several different ways of 
using Nietzsche, often at odds within a single text. The writer will at times 
imitate or echo his source, at times engage him in intense rivalry. Similarly the 
specific form the connection assumes can be created by anyone of four 
alternatives definable by a matrix of possible relations between idea and image 
(the source's ideas or images can be rendered by a writer conceptually or as part 
of concrete situations). Finally we can distinguish the influence significant 
within a literary text by defining "the Nietzschean elements" as they are 
"gathered along some interpretive axis within the work like a basic formal 
pattern, an underlying thematic concern or assumption, a structural element, or 
an autonomous aspect of a larger whole" (147). Such openness to "intrinsic" 
complexity in turn justifies a concern almost exclusively with "high-culture" 
contexts because the cultural current created by "the sense of a break is not 
going to derive in any simple way from historical conditions" (413). Before 
we can return literature to society we must understand its complex organization 
and social details. 
I quote Foster a good deal because a good deal of care has gone into his 
specific formulations. This is nowhere more evident than in the book's 
central chapter which clarifies the basic network of Nietzsehean ideas that 
forms his legacy to modernism. The ideas themselves are common coin for 
any reader of Nietzsche. All too uncommon, nonetheless, is the precision 
Foster brings to them as he tries to establish the four master concepts 
structuring the conceptual forces constituting the Nietzschean current in 
Modernism. (Foster offers somewhat inconsistent summaries on pp. 40-41, 417.) 
Most obviously resonant for writers is the polaristic model of thinking central 
to the birth of tragedy. Foster avoids effusive speculations on the Apollonian 
and Dionysiac in order to concentrate on another level of inquiry. He wants us 
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to understand how Nietzsche tempts writers to explore dualistic tensions! so he 
emphasizes the structural model he establishes. Nietzsche's poles dramatize links 
between conceptual and instinctual drives and they articulate crucial differences 
I I betvveen negations (when the opposed drives exclude one another) and COll-
: I traries (where the two forces organize their energies by means of a dynamic 
relation to one another). Polar thinking in Nietzsche is not dialectical because 
one does not emerge as the negation of another. Thus no Hegelian resolution 
is possible. Rather the key contrast is between "polar nullity," a state where 
onc force cannot contribute to a larger whole, and "hi-polar unity," a state 
I "possessing greater energy and complexity than either pole" (46). In Greek 
! tragedy, for example, there is no synthesis of Apollonian and Dionysiac but a 
single agent can experience the forces in poised balance-necessity in form and 
form inseparable from the tragic root. 
Foster's subsequent categories capture basic ways that Nietzsche transforms 
I his initial oppositions into a critical psychology capable of analyzing the 
i ills of a culture and of proposing alternatives to it. Once the psychology is 
clear, one can move to the portraits, images and myths which give concrete 
density to Nietzsche's cultural vision. Such elements in turn take their fullest 
strength when seen in relation to the ideal of psychological health which Foster 
defines as "aesthetic naturalism." This concept unites the source of drives 
in instinct with a teleological element that can be realized as a form of process. 
"Health" consists in experiencing the instincts as being satisfied within the 
activity of creating complex, integrative forms immanent within the moment. 
Nietzsche thus unites aestheticism's cult of art with naturalistic imperatives and 
establishes fundamental homologies between psychic and textual forces. lVlore-
over the immanence inherent in seeing the satisfaction of, instinct as the 
root and goal of human forming acts gives Nietzsche a powerful contrastive stance 
from which he can clearly indicate the forms of idealism blocking self-realization. 
Ressentiment and tragic affirmation play out this drama-the former a reactive 
subordination of self to outside pressures and higher values (whose emptiness 
breeds a frustrated, objectless violence) and the latter an image of the self 
fully confronting all the forces impinging on and testing the individual "viII. 
Such conflicts are so fully imagined that the particular forces establish abstract 
categories which incorporate basic social and cultural homologues. Foster's 
third topic, then, consists of the concepts of nihilism and decadence which carry 
these homologies, but often with a mythic elaboration that requires Foster to 
attempt a precision Nietzsche "failed to provide": "a decadent culture" can 
shape experience to some extent even though its capacity to affirm life fully 
and directly "has been lost" (85), while "vith Nihilism "no cultural form 
at all is produced" (86) . The latter case is a polar opposite of tragic 
affirmation because it consists in facing the universe as total chaos and finding no 
cultural or personal forming energy that enables one to affirm life. Similarly 
the mind's capacity to think imagistically collapses into fragmented abstractions 
and the vague pieties of Wagnerian mysticism. 
Foster's transition to his final topic reveals the muted, humane precision of his 
style. "So intense is Nietzsche's mood of cultural crisis that even this stern 
critic of wishful thinking voices hopes for renewal" (109). In order to grasp 
Nietzsche the prophet, the stance modern writers found hardest to take, Foster 
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concentrates on the various roles the concept of "will to power" plays in 
Nietzsche's efforts to replace "nihilism with coherence, objectivity with 
personality" (113). The will to power is attributed to the man of willful 
self-mastery, to the man who accepts the assertions of instinct (even to the point 
of violence), and to the visionary who can stare down nihilism and create 
meanings for the age of anti-Christ. Foster sees clearly how Nietzsche's needs 
make him vacillate between imagining power as productive and as coercive 
making. And Foster's orientation allows him to preserve the multiple senses 
since in this respect Nietzsche becomes a type for the workings of the legacy 
that continues to fascinate and to repel. Nietzsche's aesthetic naturalism 
captures energies still constructive in an age sceptical of all idealizations. Yet 
it 'is impossible not to try to idealize those drives, with the dangerous result of 
an aesthetic politics that confuses individual and social forms of organization. 
Thus built into Nietzsche's critical power is a fonn of idealization terrifying 
to the residues of humanist sensibilty. These contraries make it impossible for 
the writers studied to rest content with too facilely Nietzschean a stance. 
In his discussions of Nietzsche's ideas, Foster gives brief summaries of 
their reception by his novelists. Now, after a brief transitional discussion of 
images and myth in Nietzsche, Foster shifts the emphases from idea to image 
and from a single network to the various dramatic worlds engendered by a 
complexity that demands non-discursive presentation. I cannot here discuss in 
detail the readings of Tbe lrmnoralist, Death in Venice, Women in Love, 
The Plumed Serpant, Man's Fate, Tbe Walnut Trees of the Altenburg, and 
Doctor Faustus. Suffice it to say that as a practical critic Foster is always 
interesting, often moving, and occasionally brilliant (lus treatment of what Tadzio 
means to Aschenbach, of the cultural tensions IVlalraux deals with, and of the ways 
Lawrence uses his "material imagination" in Women in Love are practical 
criticism at its very best). Moreover Foster complements his sense of specific 
textual dramas by organizing his work into a narrative example of a legacy at 
work. Each text is chosen in part because it embodies a specific encounter 
with its predecessor's use of Nietzsche. His project also establishes a good 
deal more flexibility than most academic critics muster. For by concentrating 
on the use and generative force of specific ideas, he need not squeeze his 
material into a single thematic structure. Foster's work is often more com-
mentary than interpretation as it fills out the significance of images and scenes, 
shows how characers reveal rich psychological complexes, or traces some 
feature of an author's rethinking earlier solutions. Correspondingly Foster is 
free to perform his own multiple critical selves as he moves between texture 
and structure and among stances developed in each of the countries he studies 
(especially those represented by Richards, Kermode, and Auerbach). 
Such significant virtues cannot be without their cost. I want to raise 
the issue of whether even a work as judicious and sensitive as Foster's can achieve 
a fully satisfying treatment of influence while subordinating theoretical speCUlation 
to a sophisticated form of critical empiricism. Consider first the problem that 
vexes all empiricism-how to locate the specific object which establishes concrete 
tests for empirical propositions. What concept of force will clarify the path of 
transmission from source to the resulting structures? Foster gives us a four-term 
matrix for this relationship and he aclmowledges the importance of Nietzsche's 
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style. But his critical arguments concentrate on the movement from ideas to 
complex images they engender when novelists grapple with them. However 
no one is more critical than Nietzsche of so isolating ideas or giving them 
causal efficacy. As Foster realizes, a major dimension of Nietzsche's appeal 
resides in his producing a relation to ideas compelling to an age obsessed 
with psychology. This entails fonus of influence not based on precise concepts 
but centered in the seductions and permissions carried in his dramatic stances. 
At one pole the effect on his successors derives from an aphoristic style capable 
of authenticating any idea by the power of expression. But this engenders a 
complementary pathos because the writers are in a position to reflect upon 
where the success of style can lead. Triumph seems inseparable from madness 
and isolation. And these states may be signs that the ideas fail or signs 
that a fully authentic vision cannot exist in society. In either case influence 
resides in a personal plight which engenders complex problems of identification. 
To follow Nietzsche may be, on his terms, a failure of intellect and will, but 
to break from him may be a failure of courage. Instances like these call 
our attention to the distinctiveness of Nietzsche's break with the past and the 
radical restructuring of our idea of ideas that accompanies it. Especially in 
Ecce Homo and Zarathusthra, the theme Foster dwells on, of seeking a unity 
of thinking and feeling, takes the form of reversing older priorities. Ideas 
do not control feelings but express them. So, if the philosopher wants 
to capture the true hierarchy of forces in our actions, he must become what 
I call a philosopher of literal states of feeling. On the dramatic level Nietzsche 
constructs a style of inquiry where the mind tries to dwell within its own 
unmediated emotional demands. Instead of interpreting emotions, Nietzsche 
explores the emotions that drive the interpretive will. In doing that he 
liberates all reflective media-music, painting, and writing-by illustrating the 
imaginative desire inherent in making, but he also reinforces the guilt and terror 
that accompany any refusal to live out such a vision of authenticity, however 
good the rationale for moderation. Gide and Mann may be most influenced by 
Nietzsche not in their cultural criticism but in their uneasy attitude towards 
their own efforts to rationalize their own plight by trusting any ideas at all. 
And the psychological literalness of texts as diverse as the Circe chapter in 
Ulysses and Deatb of Virgil may more truly participate in the Nietzschean 
current than works which grapple with those puny characters, his II ideas." 
Perhaps even more difficult than isolating the causal units of empiricist 
inquiry about influence is deciding on what grounds one can speak of cause 
at all. I do not mean to invoke Hume but to ask how one decides where 
a figure like Nietzsche is in fact an influence and where he is simply another 
strand woven into a historical carpet. I am moved to this question by the fact 
that Foster at times faUs victim to the bane of all influence studies, the 
tendency to attribute to a specific source what may be merely a shared cultural 
condition. His reader begins to w-onder whether all modern conflicts between 
order and passion need be attributed to Dionysus and Apollo or all renderings 
of empty willfulness to Nietzschean ideas of decadence and nihilism. More 
than historical accuracy is at stake. For the more we see stances as 
partially symptomatic and not governed by conscious choice, the marc the whole 
idea of influence as the rational exploitation of a legacy latent in Nietzsche seems 
• 
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terribly limited, psychologically and historically. This point need not require 
pure sociological analysis-Foster is compelling on the difficulties with this. 
But it will demand a more flexible sense of the interplay of personal and 
impersonal forces, determining and determined states of mind. That in turn 
probably involves a more complex sense of modernism than Foster provides 
because we need to know the contexts impinging on Nietzsche and creating 
conditions that allow his work to remain contemporary for the novelists. 
The question of contemporaneity, however, will not be resolved simply by 
invoking historical contexts. The morc we probe it, especially in relation to the 
need to understand the presentational and symptomatic features of Nietzsche's 
work, the more we find it difficult to rely on the linear view of history required 
for Foster's kind of influence study. On the simplest level it seems clearly inade-
quate to interpret Nietzsche's enduring influence as only the result of shared 
historical conditions. But ~hat else gives him his force and allows us to continue 
to respond to it while modifying our contemporary visions of Nietzsche? I 
cannot answer this question, but I can suggest that at the least we need a 
psychology which explains how writers from other eras can affect us. This, 
in turn, requires a strongly synchronic orientation towards what texts preserve 
and what contemporary insights allow us to claim to have been true of the 
past. If one is more sympathetic than Foster to the images of the psyche 
contained in the contemporary versions of Nietzsche provided by Derrida and 
DeLeuze, one finds terms for getting at the expressive literalness, sense of 
laughing ecstatic destruction, -and fascination with the inadequacy of our 
efforts at rationality which Foster underplays. It is true that the modernists 
lacked concepts for such phenomena, yet, as Foster argues but does not follow 
up, who continues to read Nietzsche if they seek <C concepts"? The more concrete 
the presentation, the more likely it is that contemporary critical languages can 
contribute to our grasp of the past (at least once a sense of the past frees us 
from being exclusively in their grasp). To put the point more generally, we 
must learn to read Nietzsche in the way he managed to make his contemporary 
situation a frame for understanding features of the past not apparent to the 
agents but basic to their actions. For our discussion, the most important issue 
at stake is the need for a critical language that can handle the investments basic 
to identifying and struggling with another thinker. If empiricism will not 
suffice, I think we must try to adopt for less ideological purposes the Lacanian 
concept of the imaginary as it is elaborated in Althusser, Machery, and Jameson. 
Nietzsche especially demands such work because his own psychic stage is 
often filled by his submitting to the ultimate appeal and trap of power by 
dreaming of how he will exert influence. 
Nietzsche's lesson, in his own use of the past and in his effects, is that we 
live at once within and beyond historical terms. Our actions also take place 
against a typological backdrop and in view of successors who will clarify those 
features of ourselves we could not see clearly. Thus wIuIe Foster is right to 
emphasize Nietzsche's perspectivism, he should also sympathize with the 
complex psyche that sought an understanding of perspective which would 
partially deny the necessity of relativism it affirms. No fully human thinker 
yields his vitality to a historicist empiricism. The best proof of this is the 
feeling we get from books like Foster's which so fully understand a major 
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figure's ideas that, as they look for sources, they in fact reverse the priorities. 
Reading Fostcr I often felt that he was not so much identifying actual influences 
as demonstrating how fully we can read modern fiction if we fully internalize 
in our readings modes of attention exemplified in Nietzsche's work At his 
richest Foster says less about the historical Nietzsche than about the permanent 
Nietzsche who lives by determining what in history we can take as empirically 
compelling. Nietzsche even offers ideas for interpreting this ycry stnngc 
phenomenon, ideas ·whose concern \yith the power of constructed images may 
be constitutive of modernist aproachcs to fiction. 
CHARLES ALTIERI 
University of TVas/Jington 
Alte17lative Pleasures: Postl'calist Fiction and The TTaditi01l by Philip Stcvick. 
Urbana, Chicago, London: Thc University of Illinois Prcss, 1981. Pp. xii + 
156. $13.95. 
HOriZ011S of Assent: A1odemis711, Post711odc1'llism m/d tbe ironic Imagination 
by Alan Vlildc. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1981. Pr. xii + 209. $15.00. 
\iVhile postmodcrnist litcrature and its accomp:mying criticism moYc in marc 
than one dircction, its strongest thrust against modernism aims at a redefinition 
of thc nature of form and order in literaturc, of the relation of litcraturc to 
the world, of the self or subject in rclation to others. Y Ct both the literature 
and criticism of postmodernism continue to be shaped by the modernist 
perception of the world as fragmcnted, random, contingent, disordered and 
chaotic with the consequence that the self fecls radically alicnated from others 
and a society bcreft of any common or communal yalues and faith. Sometimes 
the modernist perception seems based all a reading of recent scientific theory. 
somctimes on a Jiscomfiting reading of society :111<1 the morc radical ll1mTIllents 
\\'ithin it. YVhatc\'cr the ~ase, m;dernisr \\:riters and their sllpportiT1f! critics 
Y<llued a highl" ordered literanue of irOJw, l11\'th and symbol th:1t Lldicalk 
probed the :lcJ;ths of the self and all too {reC]u~ntly absor'bcd charJeter imo 'a 
reflexive aesthctic \'Crbal pattcrning. 
Postmodernism and its 3ttcnd~mt criticism continues to \Yor);: within modernism's 
perceptioll and metaphors of rC3lity, but rcjccts the depth of the subject, 
!lnds delight in SurL1CCS, accepts ch:loS and llllilds it into forms which 
nloril,c such perceptiolls. "-here the highl)' wrought modernist \1:orl, ~t(J()d in 
(lpp()~iti(lI1 tn the \\·orld. ofrcll secking to rise Jbm'c its Ch:l()" through c:1rcfully 
~lrucrurl'd ir(ln~·. thc po.mnodcrnist \\'ork m:!l,es fC1gllleT1t:1!i()!l p:lrt (If its form 
:lilt! oft(:Il seeks to reducc the number of ~i!!IlS that distill~\li .. h it :1S :"In. 
Pr(lfc~~(lrs Stl.Ticl, ~l!ld \\'ildc furrher in prm'()c;,i\'(, \\":1:'5 the ~CJlIr:ll thrmr of 
1'(1q11l[lderni~r critici~rn and in their succc~s come to illu:-.rr.1tc the h{)l1nd:lfic~ oi 
rh:lt criticism. 
S;e\·ick. in .-11:aii.1ti:·~' PlonlTL·.f, SCts :\meric:m fiction of the bre ·si:·:tics 
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and the decade Df the 'seventies against the background of both the realist and 
modernist traditions. As opposed to past seriousnesses about the novel, con-
temporary fiction bases itself on the metaphor of fiction-as-game, as play. 
This ludic impulse releases enormous energy and feeling and expresses itself in 
a style which provides perceptions and knowledge unavailable in previous modes 
of fiction. 
For example, Stevick points out, contemporary fictionists use naive narrators 
and forms of narration, not as Voltaire did, to satirize the naif's world view, nor 
as Salinger did, to reveal the naif from the inside, but rather to create a 
deliberately cartoon-like clarity of vision valorizing vulnerability and self-exposure. 
The grim and depressing, even the awful and violent are, according to Stevick, 
rendered tolerable through the "sweet and sometimes stupid voice which 
speaks of them" (p. 93). Naivete, then) is not automatically funny) nOf a 
distortion of mature experience, but a valid mode of perceiving, and, more 
importantly, of being in the world. 
Similarly for Stevick the lrind of characters and the feeling expressed for 
them signals postmodernism)s different relationship with the world. Modernism 
congealed around Sattre's metaphor that hell is other people and took an 
attitude that Stevick characterizes as "ironic scorn)) toward professionals and the 
lower classes. Contemporary fiction not only introduces such characters, but 
treats them with an "unreserved sensual pleasure, in living in the world, 
different from anything in the decades before" (p. 54). Further, recent 
writers treated such characters and the events in their lives with tenderness 
and sentiment. Such willingness to display feelings and attitudes uncharacteristic 
of modernism reduces the distance benveen authors and their creations, benveen 
audience and character and finally between author, work, and audience. 
Often enough these fictions are filled with what Stevick calls "mock-fact" 
and "dreck 11 (images from commercial culture), not to establish verisimilitude 
as with the realists, nor to create a reflexive, aesthetically coherent symbol 
system, as with the moderns, but rather to mock the whole enterprise of 
erecting a fictive world so central to both realists and modernists. The result 
is the release of inventive and comic energy "reflecting an ambivalent 
evaluation of the things of this world" (p. 133). 
These elements are often combined in works that give the appearance of 
traditional satire; but, Stevick argues, that satire has no object, no normative 
values. To paraphrase Nathaniel West, whom Stevick quotes: "there is 
nothing in these works to root for, and what is worse, no rooters 11 (pp. 120, 121). 
Such satire demonstrates, Stevick claims, "the pleasure and power of a free 
invention that looks like satire, but elevates its own stylized vision above its 
author's wish to direct our judgments" (p. 121). The energy of style, then, 
takes its place with the naif, the vulnerable, the nonjudgmental, in Stevick's 
characterization of postmodernist fiction in America. 
In H orizolls of Assent, Wilde focuses on the theme of irony in modernist 
and postmodernist fiction. Conventional literary irony, whose locus is satire, 
implies, according to Wilde, that where there is fragmentation, chaos, debase-
ment, and stupidity, there once was unity, form, order, elevation, 2nd intel-
ligence. In short, conventional literary irony, here called "mediate" irony, 
implies the existence of a metaphysical and religious order; it looked back 
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toward Eden, or upward toward heaven to find its norms. In contrast to this 
irony modernism developed "disjunctive" irony which posits no Eden or 
heaven, but rather uses irony to order the fragmented and chaotic world it 
perceives. This irony seeks to create a literature in which equal and opposed 
possibilities are held in a state of total poise. At its apex, this irony becomes 
" absolute" irony, the irony of high modernism. 
Dialectically, however, this irony contains its opposites, termed by Wilde the 
" anironic." The anironic of absolute irony, gives rise to a desire not only 
for fusion, but also for participation in the world, rather than for hovering above 
it, savoring aesthetic paradox. The anironic in Wilde is close to Stevick's 
sentiment, but he feels the latter term cannot be effectively reintroduced to 
critical discourse, so laden is it with pejorative connotation. Further, Wilde 
argues, the move away from modernist irony finally reflects that movement's 
failure to come to terms with experience. 
Absolute irony then, generates a new form of irony Wilde calls '~suspensive." 
TIlls irony is an integrative gesture toward the world. In the words of Jerzy 
Kosinski (whom Wilde quotes) suspensive irony provides" a true sense of the 
randomness of life's moments, [and] man is at peace with himself" (p. 10). 
Suspensive irony, ,",vithout diminishing the modernist sense of the world's 
fragmentation, participates in the world, finds ways of enjoying "the smaller 
pleasures." The bulk of Wilde's book traces in astute and provocative readings 
the developments of this irony in the works of Forster, Isherwood, Compton-
Burnett, Sukenick, Federman, Elkin, and Barthe1me. 
Interestingly, in an argument that needs full-fledged development, Wilde 
roots irony in perception, in the body. With Merleau-Ponty he claims 
that there exists" a natal pact between ourselves and the world, between ourselves 
and the body" (p. 29). By rooting irony in the body, Wilde not only makes 
it a pre-critical and pre-conceptual response, but begins to develop a materialist 
theory of irony. He concurs with the spleen in l\1ax Apple's story "Free 
Agents" which asserts: "Now it's the body's turn to come into the twentieth 
century" (p. 132). Wilde approaches the insight of Fusto Maijstral, the 
Maltese poet in Fynchon's V who believes that art is neither a communication 
with angels nor the unconscious, but "with the guts, genitals and five portals 
of sense." For Wilde, irony is the body's response to doubleness, to frag-
mentation and that response enables postmodernist irony to enter into the 
world. 
Stevick and Wilde are aware of the negative criticism of postmodernist 
fiction and its interpretors. The" cultivation," says Stevick, "of a range of 
verbal activities that in another period might be called cuteness, cleverness, or 
mere facility and worse" (p. 45) has brought postInodernism under fire. 
Wilde points out that reductive postmodernism (represented for him by 
aspects of Sukenick and Gass), while scorning "the modernist desire to recover 
original wholeness," nevertheless imposes "on unpatterned reality the squamous-
ness of the abstracting mind" (p. 144) and comes close to repeating the 
aestheticism of the early part of the century. "Or," Wilde asserts, "one 
should say that aestheticism is the master sign under which much that is 
reductive in contemporary culture coalesces" (p. 144). 
Correct in their assessment of the dangers of aestheticism, these critics stop 
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short of an analysis that reveals the root cause of that tendency in both 
modernism and postmodernism. Put simply, the modernist rhetorical cluster 
for describing the world-chaos, fragmentation, randomness-is at best ambig-
uous and at worst mystifying. In its baldest forms this cluster implies that 
not only are the universe and nature contingent and random, but that social 
processes are finally uninterpretable and therefore unchangeable. Acceptance 
of that cluster deprives the world and society of meaning, further isolating the 
self. In this relationship energy and style or ironic gestures become significant 
responses. But changes in style are just that because there is no designated 
agency of social change and we move randomly from one style to another. 
Pynchon's Fausto knew well the effect of bombs on metaphors and bodies, 
and Elkin's Boswell, breaking the lock on the Colloseum door the better to be 
seduced by the Principessa, learns of the effects of money on the body and its 
attendant metaphors. If the criticism of which Stevick and Wilde form a part 
is to move forward, it must begin a critique of the rhetoric \.Vith which modern-
ism and postmodernism describe the world; in particular if it is determined to 
participate in the world, it must come to understand the effects of bombs and 
money, war and work on the body and on the language of literature. Post-
modernist fiction, however energetic, sentimental or anironic, and stylish, can 
only provide us with mythologies in Roland Barthes' sense of the term. The 
central processes and structure of the social world are anonymous and the 
relationship between the social world and the language of literature remains 
mystified. If postmodernism is to move toward the world and give us more 
than myths of adjustment, it must encounter the relationship between the 
language of literature and the language we use to discuss social, political, and 
economic processes. That is the task for postmodernist criticism in which 
Wilde and Stevick will hopefully share. 
RICHARD WASSON 
Livingston College, Rutgers University 
